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THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1964: A CRITIQUE
INTRODUCION
The Criminal Justice Act of 1964,- following twenty-five years of
legislative efforts to secure federal funds for the payment 6f assigned
counsel and public defenders, received the support of both houses on
August 7, 1964. As a result of the measure's enactment, there has been
congressional recognition and an assumption of the public responsibility2
of providing counsel for the indigent accused in federal courts. While
the Act is primarily concerned with the creation of a system of com-
pensating assigned attorneys, provisions as to its administration illustrate
the extent of such responsibility.
By specifying the type of offense, stage at which counsel is to be
appointed, and duration of such representation, the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel is impliedly defined in these areas. The purpose
of this note is to analyze and evaluate the validity of limitations indicated
by the Act's determinations as to 1) the exclusion of counsel for petty
offenders, 2) the time at which counsel is initially made available, and
3) the omission of representation in collateral proceedings.
SuBSTANCE oiF THE AcT
Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, representation is provided for
defendants in criminal prosecutions, other than petty offenses, who are
financially unable to retain an attorney. Such "representation" includes,
in addition to counsel, investigative , expert and related services.- Each
district court is directed by the provisions of the Act to formulate
a plan whereby legal assistance is furnished by private attorneys,
members of a legal aid group, or a combination of these. Counsel for
appellate proceedings is to be supplied under a program established
by the judicial council of the circuit.
Upon inquiring, and determining that the defendant is financially
unable to obtain counsel, the court or the United States Commissioner
1. 18 U.S.C. 5 3006A (1964).
2. The public responsibility aspect of providing counsel for indigent defendants was
initially developed in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335, 344 (1963) wherein the court
stated: "That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have money
hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indication of the widespread belief that lawyers
in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged with crime
to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries,
but it is in ours:'
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is to appoint an attorney to act as defense counsel.3 The "defendant
for whom counsel is appointed shall be represented at every stage of
the proceedings from his initial appearance before the United States
commissioner through appeal." 4
Compensation, at a rate not exceeding $15.00 per hour when in court
or before a United States commissioner and $10.00 per hour for time
spent out of court plus reimbursement for expenses, is limited to $500.
in felony cases and $300 where a misdemeanor is charged. In addition
to these sums, $300 exclusive of reimbursement for expenses reasonably
incurred, is available for investigative, expert and other necessary
services. The net result is that the attorney receives some compensation
for his time and effort expended on behalf of the defendant and is no
longer required to finance the expenses of the defense from his pocket
nor forego the employment of investigators or experts who may be
essential to the defense because he is unable to personally finance such
services.
"MISDEMEANORS OTHER THAN PETTY OFFENSES"
The federal courts, prior to the Supreme Court decision in Johnson
v. Zerbst,0 dealt with rather limited aspects of the right to counsel but
there was no pronouncement that they were required by the Sixth
Amendment to appoint counsel for indigent defendants. Jobnson made
such appointment a jurisdictional prerequisite ruling that an indigent
accused of a felony was to be afforded the aid of counsel. Gideon v.
Wainwright7 in extending the right to counsel to state defendants,
acknowledged that the guarantee was not restricted to capital cases but
failed to indicate whether an indigent charged with a sub-felony offense
would be entitled to legal representation. While the Supreme Court
has never directly held that a right does or does not exist to have
3. "This is the first time a provision of positive law has been enacted stating that a
defendant who cannot afford to hire a lawyer is entitled to have one appointed at the
time he appears before the commissioner." Shafroth, The New Criminal Justice Act,
50 AJ3A.J. 1051 (1965).
4. 18 US.C. S 3006A (C) (1964).
5. The same limitations are applicable to representation in an appellate court ie. $500
in a felony case and $300 in a case involving a misdemeanor; "In extraordinary circum-
stances, payment in excess of the limits stated herein may be made if the district court
certifies that such payment is necessary to provide fair compensation for protracted
representation, and the amount of the excess payment is approved by the chief judge of
the circuit." 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (d) (1964).
6. 304 US. 458 (1938).
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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court-appointed counsel in a misdemeanor case,8 the issue has been
considered in the District of Columbia9 and Fifth Circuit.10
The Criminal Justice Act, in enunciating the conditions under which
counsel is to be appointed limits the type of offense to felonies and
misdemeanors other than petty offenses." Consequently a question
arises as to whether this delineation of the right to counsel is justified
or unwarrantably deprives the petty offender of the protection afforded
by the Sixth Amendment.' 2 An examination of the permissibility of
summary consideration of petty offenses and the intent of the framers
of the Constitution in using the phrase "all criminal prosecutions"
readily supports application of the limitation.
It is this phraseology which has proved troublesome by leading to
assertions that "all criminal prosecutions" denotes all offenses of a
criminal nature. "Even a Supreme Court dictum has entertained the
suggestion, arguendo, that petty offenses might be included in 'all
criminal prosecutions' .... ,, 13 The view was advanced in Schick v.
United States,'4 where it was stated:
If the language had remained "criminal offenses" it might have
been contended that it meant all offenses of a criminal nature, petty
as well as serious, but when the change was made to "crimes" and
made in light of the popular understanding of the word "crimes" as
stated by Blackstone, it is obvious that the intent was to exclude from
the constitutional requirement of a jury trial of petty offenses.1
It should be noted that discussion as to the right to trial by jury when
accused of a petty violation is directly relevant to the discussion of
right to counsel in such prosecutions as both are guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment. Thus the troublesome phraseology of "all criminal
8. 19 SW. L. J. 593, 599 (1965).
9. Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D. C. Cir. 1942). (Counsel required where defendant
charged with serious misdemeanor.)
10. Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965) (Counsel required where de-
fendant charged with petty offense.)
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A ( ) (1964).
12. U.S. CoN-sT. AMEND. VI. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law. and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
13. Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and Trial by Jury, 39 HARv.
L. REv. 917 at 925 (1926).
14. 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
15. Id. at 70.
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prosecutions" is applicable to both and although the court. has never
considered the term in a right to counsel context it has in a trial by jury
case.
In District of Columbia v. Clawas,'" the Supreme Court examined the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and ruled that persons charged
with a federal "petty offense" are not entitled to trial by jury. The
rationale of that decision being that summary consideration, was per-
missible for petty offenses when the Constitution was adopted and there
had been no change in the generally accepted standards of punishment
which would bar such treatment now.
Pertinent data on the subject is afforded by statutory and con-
stitutional provisions subsisting in the colonies and states prior to the
adoption of the Bill of Rights. Why in drafting the Sixth Amendment
did Madison use the phrase "all criminal prosecutions"?
It is right to attribute purpose and not caprice to him,... The
explanation likewise lies in history. Madison's language was not his
own. He took it from the Bill of Rights with which he was most
familiar-that of his own Virginia.17
In Virginia,18 the requirement of trial by jury did not extend to petty
offenses;18 a similar formula existed in Pennsylvania 0 and Maryland.2'
Certainly the framers of the Constitution meant no more than the es-
tablished practices in their various states by "all criminal prosecutions"
and the exclusion of petty offenses was the accepted doctrine in the
16. 300 US. 617 at 629 (1937).
17. Frankfurter and Corcoran, supra note 13 at 974-5.
18. The VIRGmIN BiL. oF RIGHTs, § 8, adopted June 12, 1776, provides in pertinent
part: "That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the
cause and nature of his accusation to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to
call for evidence in his favor, and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury.. .. " [Emphasis
Added].
19. Frankfurter and Corcoran, supra note 13 at 975. See District of Columbia v.
Clawans, supra note 16 (court discusses petty offenses at time of adoption of Con-
stitution).
20. The Pa 1NsYLVANA Bus. or RiGHTs, § 9, adopted September 28, 1776, provides in
pertinent part: "That in all prosecutions for criminal affenses, a man hath the right to
be heard by himself and his council, to demand the cause and nature of his accusation,
to be confronted with the witnesses, to call for evidence in his favour, and a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury... ." [Emphasis Added].
21. The MARYLAN BaL oF RiGirs, § 19, framed November 11, 1776, provides in
pertinent part: "That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right to be in-
formed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the indictment or charge...
to be allowed counsel; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have process
for his witnesses; to examine the witnesses against him, on oath; and to a speedy trial
by an impartial fury. . .. " [Emphasis Added].
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colonies and subsequently in the states.
If this would not be enough to justify the exclusion of coverage of
petty offenses made by the Act, consideration of the practical aspects of
supplying counsel might. Some line must be drawn delineating the
right when we consider that funds are limited as is "lawyer-manpower,"
since it would hardly be feasible to "furnish assigned counsel to 'all'
indigent misdemeanor defendants." 23
STAGE FOR APPOINTMENT: APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER
The question of whether a criminal defendant has been denied the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is most often brought into
issue when the accused has confessed before consulting with an attorney
and the prosecution seeks to admit the confession at the trial stage.
When the confession was obtained by coercion, be it either physical or
mental, there is no doubt that the accused's constitutional rights have
been violated. 24 Unfortunately, there is no dividing line or standard
with which to determine whether the confession was made voluntarily
or was the result of coercive measures. By the same token, the de-
termination of when the appointment of counsel should be made and
at what stage the accused should be permitted to consult with his
attorney is without strict criteria.
Counsel then, has been more than a technical aid; it has served to
overcome the original unfairness of the balance of state against in-
dividual. Historically, this role has been played mainly at trial-the
focus of confrontation between the state and the individual. If,
however, a critical confrontation occurs at the earlier investigative stage
of the process, we might have to alter our conception of the role
counsel must play to readjust the balance25
The Supreme Court did alter its conception of the role played by
counsel in Escobedo v. Illinois26 where the defense attorney was de-
picted as the guardian of constitutional rights from the time the
investigation becomes accusatory. In an opinion rendered by Mr.
Justice Goldberg, the right to counsel was described as attaching
22. Frankfurter and Corcoran, supra note 13 at 969.
23. Hall & Kamisar. MoDar Cmwmwx PaocmURF., at 86 (1965).
24. Protection against coerced confessions in federal prosecutions is afforded by the
Fifth Amendment which guarantees that no person "shall be compelled in any Criminal
Case to be a witness against himself," while as stated in Crooker v. California, 357 Us.
433, (1958) "it is well established that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits use of
coerced confessions in state prosecutions."
25. 73 YAXau L. J. 1000 at 1034 (1964).
26. 378 US. 478 (1964).
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absolutely when the investigation has focused on the defendant as the
offender and the police "purpose is to elicit a confession."
Whether an investigation has "focused" on a particular suspect and
if interrogation is employed to obtain a confession is largely dependent
upon the circumstances. Unfortunately, the holding failed to specify
what condition or conditions constituted a violation of the indigents
constitutional right, thereby permitting the states to interpret and apply
the "rule" in a far from uniform manner.17
The Criminal Justice Act, in seeking a workable and practical
method of providing representation for indigent defendants, has pre-
scribed a definite and ascertainable stage when the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel attaches. Upon determining the accused is fi-
nancially uanble to procure an attorney, the appointment of counsel is
made on his first appearance before the United States commissioner or
court.28  Thus the framers of the Act made the defendant's initial
appearance for arraignment the stage when the constitutional mandate
becomes operative. But in so doing has the Act taken cognizance of the
Escobedo decision? Insight of its compliance is readily exhibited by
examining the Court's reasoning in requiring the aid of an attorney
at the accusatory stage in conjunction with the necessity of prompt
arraignment.
At first glance, it is immediately apparent that the Court was not
motivated solely by Escobedo's need of advice from one familiar with
the technical aspects of the law. The opinion states that even though
he was told of his right to remain silent, he had not been advised what to
do "in face of a false accusation that he had fired the fatal shots." "
By having counsel present after the suspect becomes the accused and
police seek incriminating statements, it becomes a certainty that a
defendant is not only aware of his constitutional rights but may also
be advised by a lawyer in exercising such rights during the questioning. 0
The other and possibly main purpose was recognized by Mr. Justice
Douglas' dissent in Crooker v. California wherein he states that:
The presence of counsel at the interrogation also serves as a curb
on police excesses and on the possibility of the investigator's falsifica-
27. Cooper v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 883, 140 S.E.2d 688 (1964); People v. Dorado,
40 Cal. Rptr 264, 394 P.2d 952 (1964); People v. Hartgraves, 31 Il.2d 375, 202 N.E.2d
33 (1964); State v. Fox, 131 N.W. 2d684 (1964).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (b) (1964).
29. Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 26 at 485.
30. Enker and Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo
v. Illinois, 49 MiNN. L. REv. 63 (1964).
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don of the circumstances surrounding the accused's incriminating
statements.31
The imposition of counsel, as applied under the Escobedo decision, is
a device to protect individuals from police coercion in securing a
confession, 2 consequently, insuring the "benefit" of the constitutional
guarantee.33
The two-fold purpose of the Supreme Court, is given effect by the
provisions of the Criminal Justice Act coupled with the prompt ar-
raignment requirements of the McNabb-Mallory rule. "Since the...
rule is not a constitutional doctrine but rather is grounded in the Court's
powers of supervision over the administration of federal justice, it does
not apply to the states." 3' Thus, if a state adopted a statute similar
to the Criminal Justice Act, absent a state requirement of immediate
arraignment, the same compliance would not result, but "nearly all the
states have similar enactments." 35
In essence, McNabb v. United States36 and Mallory v. United States,37
aside from factual situations, are identical other than their respective
statutory basis for requiring prompt arraignment. The latter was de-
cided after the adoption of Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure3 8 in 1946 while the former relies upon an earlier Con-
gressional command 9 to the effect that an arresting officer is under a
duty to bring the defendant before the nearest United States com-
missioner or other judicial officer. The Court in McNabb ruled that the
confessions were inadmissible since the questioning was in disregard
of the duty Congress had imposed on federal law officers. Although
Congress had not explicitly required exclusion of such evidence, the
Court deemed it essential to insure the effectiveness of the Congressional
policies embodied therein. The Mallory case, on the other hand, was
primarily a restatement and affirmation of the "exclusionary rule" of
McNabb to support the policy of Rule 5 (a). In both cases there
is underlying dictum indicating that federal officers may not violate
31. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443 (1958).
32. Enker and Elsen, supra note 30 at 69.
33. Justice Jackson, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) expressed that "if the State may arrest on suspicion and interro-
gate without counsel, there is no denying the fact that it largely negates the benefits of
the constitutional guaranty of the right to assistance of counsel."
34. 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1942).
35. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
36. Supra note 34.
37. Supra note 35.
38. Fed. R. Crim P. 5 (a).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1946); now covered by Rules 4 and 5 of the Fed. R. Crim. P.
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the law in acting to enforce the law, as such contravention will render
evidence secured thereby inadmissible.
Though this prompt arraignment condition for admissibility, or
McNabb-Mallory rule, was not specifically directed toward the right
to counsel and the implementation of that right, it has been a con-
sequence.40 In Escobedo, the Court observed, in regard to the period
from arrest to indictment, that "the fact that many confessions are
obtained during this period points up its critical nature as a 'stage when
legal aid and advice' are surely needed." 41 The resulting automatic
exclusion of confessions when delay occurs eliminates possible problems
of proof under the Escobedo rule, since no showing of intent to elicit
a confession or that the investigation had focused on the defendant is
necessary. 42 By such exclusion nothing is to be gained by detention prior
to appearing before the commissioner and both the opportunity and
temptation to coerce confessions is minimized. By having the accused
before the commissioner without unreasonable and unnecessary delay,
he is familiarized with his constitutional rights at the earliest possible
stage, as Rule 5 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure re-
quires.4
With the advent of the Criminal Justice Act, counsel, if the accused
is financially unable to retain an attorney, will also be made available
by the United States Commissioner as this would constitute the "initial
appearance" described by the Act as the time for appointment. Theo-
retically then, the suspect is arrested, brought before a magistrate
"without unnecessary delay," informed of his constitutional rights, and
now, under the Act, supplied with legal representation, all within a
relatively short period of time. As a result, the defendant is provided
with counsel as early in the proceedings as reasonably possible.
In actual practice, the theoretical model should be effective in the
vast majority of cases although two extraneous factors may diminish its
performance. The first of these evolves from the reality that magistrates
40. Hall and Kamisar, supra note 23 at 126.
41. Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 26 at 488.
42. Lockhart, Kamisar, and Choper, CONSETuTiONAL CRIMINAL PROCmU, at 137
(1964).
43. Fed. R. Crim. P. 5 (b).
Statement by the Commissioner. The commissioner shall inform the defendant
of the complaint against him, of his right to retain counsel and of his right to a
preliminary examination. He shall also inform the defendant that he is not to
be required to make a statement and that any statement made by him may be
used against him. The commissioner shall allow the defendant reasonable time
and opportunity to consult counsel and shall admit the defendant to bail as pro-
vided in these rules.
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are not always available, as when an arrest takes place in the middle of
the night or on a Sunday. The second is the product of a change in
enforcement policy resulting in a practice of questioning prior to
arresting, such as going to a suspect's home and seeking his consent
to "ask a few questions." The latter may be more easily remedied as the
securing of such consent might be labeled coercive due to the position
held by an officer and the probable inference which the suspect feels
might arise from such a refusal. On the whole though, the Criminal
Justice Act creates a distinguishable stage for the attachment of the
right to counsel and when taken in conjunction with the operation
of the McNabb-Mallory rule, the dictates of Escobedo are clearly
satisfied.
Tm ExcLUsioN OF COLLATERAL PROCEEDINGS
The Criminal Justice Act by implication has restricted its provisions
to proceedings in which there is direct consideration of the case wherein
an appointment of counsel is deemed necessary. This consequential
exclusion of collateral proceedings results from the legislative stipulation
that, "a defendant for whom counsel is appointed shall be represented
at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before the
United States commissioner or court through appeal." 44 The proceed-
ings thereby excluded may precede or be subsequent to the stages which
occur during the stated period. Administrative action with criminal
sanctions or leading to a later prosecution, in the absence of some
adjudication, are clearly disregarded as there is no initial appearance,
as referred to in the Act, at which the appointment might be made.
Nor does the Act apply to writs of heabeas corpus brought to vacate
sentences of federal or state prisoners.45 These omissions may be at-
tributed to the absence of a clear establishment of the right to counsel
by decision or practice, yet the grand jury investigation, which has been
specifically designated as a stage in which counsel is not mandatory
and where an attorney may be excluded,4 would be included in the
proceedings from initial appearance to appeal. It is these apparent in-
consistencies, with consideration of the status of the right to counsel in
the respective proceedings, which must be examined to adequately
evaluate the Act.
COUNSEL AND THE GREAT WRIT
As a casual analysis of the Act's provisions for appointment procedures
44. 18 U.S.C. S 3006A (c) (1964).
45. Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States at p. 11 (1965).
46. In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
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will indicate, the cases under which compensation for court-appointed
counsel is authorized are those involving trial and direct appeal. Thus,
there is no extension of the right to counsel to federal or state prisoners
that petition for an inquiry into the validity of their conviction by
habeas corpus.
The Writ in federal courts is purely statutory47 under which habeas
corpus is available in four different situations.48 The use of the writ in
federal courts then, is primarily, to determine the constitutional validity
of all criminal convictions where there has been want of jurisdiction or
where the conviction is due to a disregard of the accused's constitutional
rights and where the only remedy at his disposal is habeas corpus.49
Habeas corpus then, is not a form of direct review examining errors
of law or irregularities or a substitute for an appeal °0 but a collateral
attack intended to preserve "constitutional safeguards of human life
and liberty." " "It must never be forgotten that the writ of habeas
corpus is the precious safeguard of personal liberty and there is no higher
duty than to maintain it unimpaired." 52 By failing to provide counsel
for an indigent prisoner in a habeas corpus proceeding the safeguard is
impaired. The first appeal has been considered a matter of right- 3
and in both federal" and state5 courts the right of an indigent de-
fendant to be afforded representation upon an appeal has been es-
tablished. Surely the benefits to be derived from providing counsel
on appeal in presenting the merits of the appellants case are no greater
than those to be derived from supplying counsel to a prisoner seeking
to vindicate his constitutional rights by habeas corpus. It was this very
means of review, although collateral, which has been so instrumental
47. 28 US.C. 1 2241 (1948).
48. Wright, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs, at 178-9 (1963) where these
four situations are described as 1) where a foreign citizen is restrained for an act alleged
authorized by his country and a question of international law is raised, 2) where a
person in state custody for an act supposedly under federal authority, 3) when any
person is held in federal custody, 4) when a person is detained by a state "in violation
of the supreme law of the land."
49. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
50. Adams v. U.S. ex.cel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 274 (1942); Glasgow v. Moyer, 225
US. 420, 428 (1912); In Re Gregory, 219 U.S. 210, 213 (1911).
51. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 6.
52. Bowne v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939).
53. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, rehearing denied 349 U.S. 925
(1955).
54. Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1957); Johnson v. United States, 352 US.
565 (1956).
55. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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in expanding the right to counsel.Y Clearly a remedial measure ex-
pressly directed to the protection of individual rights guaranteed by
the Constitution and available when a denial of such rights is not
rectified by appellate review, is no less essential than an appeal ,where
counsel is required.
INVESTiGATION BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The restriction of compensation for appointed counsel to all stages
from the indigent's first appearance before the commissioner through
appeal, by definition does not entail the payment of attorneys represent-
ing parties appearing before administrative agencies. This "oversight"
in framing the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 quite possibly resulted
from the confusion surrounding the conduct of administrative investiga-
tion and the assistance of counsel for witnesses called upon to testify.
The situation in this regard exists and will continue to exist as:
The Courts simply do not get a sufficient number of cases on the
issue, and, as noted above, judicial opinions are more likely to deal
with the minimum required to satisfy due process rather than with
comprehensive rules of conduct and representation in administrative
proceedings. While the constitutional safeguards must be conscien-
tiously preserved, the solution to the representation problem must
come from either the legislature or the agency, or both. 7
Congress made some progress in "permitting" a witness, compelled to
appear before any agency, the right to be represented and advised by
counsel s which superseded a prevailing view that a witness compelled
to appear at an investigation by a federal agency might be denied
representation. 9 While the Administrative Procedure Act was intended
to "permit" counsel in Pll investigatory proceedings, its scope .has been
severely limited by "subsequent legislative exemptions and administrative
disregard of the statutory mandate." '0
In neither the state nor federal system are the police or prosecutor's
offices allowed to compel witnesses to submit to interrogation and to
produce records. When an accused is questioned, he is not only per-
mitted but guaranteed the assistance of counsel. Yet a person compelled
to appear and produce documents by agencies charged with the en-
forcement of certain statutes, as the Federal Communications Com-
56. Fellman, Ti DEFENDA rs RIGHTs, at 73 (1958).
57. 16 AD. LAw REv. 325 at 332 (1964).
58. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 US.C. $5 1001-11 (1952).
59. Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787, (7th Cir. 1944).
60. 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 887 (1957).
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mission, Internal Revenue Service" or Federal Aviation Agency, and
who frequently deal with criminal infractions of these statutes, is in
many cases not permitted representation and if an indigent, not pro-
vided with counsel.6 The rationale of proponents for the exclusion
of counsel analogizes these administrative proceedings to hearings before
a grand jury, which are also investigative in nature and where counsel
is not required.6"
The major purpose of imposing counsel requirements at pre-trial
stages as arraignment, preliminary hearing, and pre-indictment stages,
as depicted by Escobedo, has been to enable the defendant or prospective
defendant to avail himself of the constitutional guarantees which insure
that at trial the right to counsel will not have become "a very hollow
thing." An individual appearing before an administrative agency being
unaware of his constitutional rights might just as easily succumb to the
pressure and persistence of the investigator. The purpose of the ad-
ministrative investigation is by its very nature to gather information to
be applied in formulating administrative rules or proposals for legisla-
tion or to uncover facts leading to an adjudicatory proceeding. It is this
last class of investigation wherein the role to be played by counsel is
identical with that developed by the "right to counsel cases." Although
the administrative proceedings do "not result in any final determination
of the witness's rights or liabilities, it may result in a subsequent
prosecution, and it is precisely this possibility of future prosecution
that gives rise to the problem of right to counsel...." 6 4
Bu-r NOT GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
"From initial appearance through appeal" by definition includes
appearances of a defendant before a grand jury, which would seemingly
be a simple proposition were it not for the Supreme Court's dicta
of In re Groban.s The appellants in that case were subpoenaed to
appear as witnesses in an investigation by the State Fire Marshall into the
causes of a fire on their business premises. The witnesses were in-
carcerated upon their refusal to answer the questions presented without
61. An example of the criminal prosecutions which may result from administrative
investigations is evident when it is considered that the Internal Revenue Service has
brought to light between 3000 and 4000 criminal liquor cases and about 1000 tax evasion
cases per year since 1958. Note, 33 U. Cmt L. Rnv. 134 at 137 (1965).
62. Mayers, The American Legal System, at 131 (1955).
63. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 429 (1960); United States v. Horton Salt Co, 338
U.S. 632, 642 (1950).
64. Supra note 57 at 325-6.
65. 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
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counsel. The Supreme Court, hearing the case on appeal from a denial
of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, affirmed the lower court's
decision stating that the statutory provision permitting the exclusion of
counsel did not deprive the appellants' of their right to counsel. In
concluding the exclusion was not repulsive to the constitutional guar-
antee of counsel, the opinion related the proceeding to a grand jury
investigation and thus, by implication, supported a similar exclusion
in grand jury cases. The right to counsel was to accrue only when the
charges were made 6 Rule 6 (d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure directly denies the admittance of defense counsel in grand
jury proceedings stating:
Who May be Present. Attorneys for the government, the witness
under examination, interpreters when needed and, for the purpose of
taking the evidence, a steriographer "or operator of a recording device
may be present while the grand jury is in session, but no person other
than the jurors may be present while the grand jury is deliberating
or voting.
The 5-4 majority of In re Groban expressed concern that the witness's
responsibility could not be reasonably adjudicated if counsel were
present.67 The Court fails to make mention of the fact that the pro-
secutor or special counsel may conduct the questioning. A witness may
invoke the protection of the Fifth Amendment and invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination but he need not be warned or advised of such
rights."' It was circumstances strikingly similar to these which led the
Supreme Court to extend the right to counsel to pre-indictment situa-
tion in Escobedo v. Illinois. Coercion was not the instrumental key in
Escobedo; it was that constitutional rights and protections could not
be properly exercised without legal representation. Thus, the change of
scene is of little significance, as is the change of characters; the threat
to constitutional guarantees corrected by Escobedo thrives in grand
jury proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The Criminal Justice Act as a remedy for uncompensated court-ap-
pointments of defense counsel might be described as adequate in that
some such legislation was imperative. It represents some insight on the
66. Id. at 333.
67. 58 COLuM. L. REv. 395 (1958).
68. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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part of legislatures of the public responsibility of insuring due process,
but the insight is limited to situations specifically designated by the
Supreme Court as coming within the province of "right to counsel".
As a guide to the extent of the constitutional requirement of representa-
tion the Act lacks perspective. The failure to take cognizance of
"vacuums" in the expansion of the guarantee as habeas corpus, grand
jury and administrative proceedings, has shifted the burden back to the
judiciary who now must complete the undertaking which in effect will
necessitate amendment to the present provisions.
Robert P. Wolf
